

House Judiciary and Transportation Committees

Joint Informational Meeting on the use of Automated License Plate Reader Systems

Monday, September 28, 2026, at 9:00 AM

Majority Caucus Room (140 Main Capitol)

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Agenda

9:00 – 9:15 a.m.

Call to Order

Member Introductions

Opening Remarks:

- Majority Chair Ed Neilson, Transportation
- Majority Chair Tim Briggs, Judiciary
- Minority Chair Kerry Benninghoff, Transportation
- Minority Chair Rob Kauffman, Judiciary

9:15 – 9:45 a.m.

Panel #1 (Law Enforcement):

- Kevin Kane, Director of Government Affairs, Flock Safety
- Scott Bohn, Executive Director, PA Chiefs of Police Association
- Alex Mohn, Secretary of the Executive Board, PA State Troopers' Association

9:45 – 10:15 a.m.

Panel #2 (Government Entities):

- Craig Shuey, Chief Operating Officer, PA Turnpike Commission
- Ron Grutza, Senior Director of Government Affairs, PA State Association of Boroughs

10:15 – 10:45 a.m.

Panel #3 (Data Privacy and Community Concerns):

- Elizabeth Randol, Legislative Director, ACLU of PA
- Chad Marlow, Senior Policy Counsel, ACLU of PA
- Deanna Dyer, J.D., President, Women's Law Project
- Lisa Femia, Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation

10:45 – 11:00 a.m.

Closing Remarks

And any other business that comes before the Committee

Adjournment

Link to Join Virtually

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join: <https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/296433900756287?p=txcIIDNDtmxjieictf>

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The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material.

Attachments:

- 09.28.26 Agenda
- 09.28.26 Transportation Memo
- Committee Official Leave Request
- 09.28.26 ACLU
- 09.28.26 Boroughs Assoc
- 09.28.26 Motorola

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- Lisa Femia, Senior Staff Attorney
Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Mitchell Smith, Legislative Counsel
Institute for Justice

10:45 – 11:00 a.m.

Closing Remarks

ED NEILSON, MEMBER
174TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
CHAIRMAN, TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 23, 2026

TO: House Transportation Committee Members

FROM: Representative Ed Neilson, Majority Chair
House Transportation Committee

RE: Joint House Judiciary and Transportation Committees Informational Meeting
Monday, September 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m.

The House Judiciary and Transportation Committees will hold an informational meeting on Monday, September 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Room 140 Main Capitol Building (Majority Caucus Room). The purpose of this informational meeting is to receive presentations related to the use of Automated License Plate Reader Systems.

Please contact Kyle Wagonseller (717-982-1114) or Josiah Shelly (717-371-4432) with any questions. If you are unable to attend this meeting, please submit an Official Leave Request Form to your corresponding Committee Chair prior to the meeting.

EN/KW



Testimony on Automatic License Plate Readers
Submitted by Elizabeth Randol, Legislative Director, ACLU of Pennsylvania
to the Pennsylvania House Transportation & Judiciary Committees
September 28, 2026

Good morning, Chairman Neilson, Chairman Briggs, Chairman Benninghoff, Chairman Kaufmann, and members of the House Transportation and Judiciary committees. Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today on automatic license plate readers. My name is Elizabeth Randol, and I am the legislative director of the ACLU of Pennsylvania.

The ACLU of Pennsylvania is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that works to defend and strengthen the individual rights and liberties guaranteed in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions through lobbying, litigation, advocacy, and education. I am here today on behalf of the roughly 100,000 ACLU-PA members and supporters throughout the commonwealth.

Privacy is a fundamental civil liberty and a cornerstone value of the American Civil Liberties Union. Privacy is not a partisan issue; it is a constitutional value. Protecting our personal data and limiting surveillance are essential to safeguarding freedom, safety and equity. All tools of surveillance must be carefully constrained to prevent misuse, abuse and overreach.

WHAT ARE AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS?

Although Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) were initially developed in the 1970s, their first use in the United States was by the United States Border Patrol in 1998. ALPRs are mobile and stationary cameras that record and digitize license plate numbers and run them against hot lists to identify vehicles and persons involved in criminal activity and other legal violations, like toll collection. The data can be stored and shared and, in so doing, allows people to be tracked for as long as the data is retained.

ALPR cameras [differ](#) from automated traffic enforcement cameras (ATEs)—like speed cameras, toll cameras, school bus or red-light cameras—because ATEs are violation-triggered, only snapping a photo/video when a vehicle breaks a law, such as speeding or running a red light. ATEs are used to **enforce** traffic laws and issue civil citations. In contrast, ALPRs operate as an **investigative tool** to generate leads by continuously scanning and logging *every single vehicle* that passes, regardless of legal behavior. That data is then entered into a database, where it is run against “hot lists” to identify potential criminal suspects.

While ALPR use by local police departments has grown steadily throughout the 21st century, their proliferation has been supercharged over the past several years through the substantial, well-financed marketing efforts of Flock Safety. But make no mistake, Flock Safety is not the only company in the mass surveillance business. Axon, Motorola/Vigilant, Genetec, PlateSmart, Innova Systems, Rekor, ELSAG, Perceptics, and Jenoptik are a few of the other [leading companies selling ALPRs](#) to police, private companies, and others.¹

ALPRs in Pennsylvania

While difficult to precisely tally ALPR use in Pennsylvania, a dataset and [map compiled by the Electronic Frontier Foundation](#) reports that more than 450 law enforcement agencies in PA utilize ALPRs. And according to [Finding Flock](#) and [Axios](#), as of September 2026:

- **Pennsylvania has the 9th-largest documented total of ALPRs in the U.S.**
- **Pennsylvania has 3,759 ALPR cameras documented statewide.**
 - 1,444 cameras in 59 cities (Pittsburgh has the most, with 266)
 - 2,315 cameras outside city limits (Allegheny County has the most, with 827)

Privacy Threats Posed by ALPRs

ALPRs were sold to American communities as a targeted tool for catching car thieves, finding missing people, and solving major crimes. But evidence for these claims is thin. In fact, a [recent study in Atlanta](#) found that despite an eightfold increase in the number of cameras integrated into the city's surveillance program, clearance rates by the Atlanta Police Department for crimes like homicide, robbery, miscellaneous larceny, and shoplifting actually *decreased* between 2021 and 2025.²

Instead, what American communities bought was an expansive form of surveillance technology that photographs and logs the movement of every driver who passes, *regardless of whether they are suspected of any crime*. Thousands of communities are now blanketed with ALPRs, quietly assembling powerful mass surveillance systems that can reconstruct where people have been, when, and how often, all *without a warrant*.

Creating patterns of behavior, ALPR data can reveal very private details about a person's life, including what meetings a person attends, what doctors' offices and religious institutions they visit, and even where they sleep at night. **We are trading privacy for profit.**

¹ Stanley, J. (2026, September 10). *Beware of other license plate surveillance companies besides flock*. American Civil Liberties Union. <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/other-alpr-vendors>

² Scott, M. (2026, July 28). *Flock, Ring and Atlanta's network of more than 28,000 integrated cameras haven't improved city's crime clearance rates*. Atlanta Community Press Collective. <https://atlpresscollective.com/2026/07/28/flock-cameras-atlanta-clearance-rates/>

This dragnet surveillance threatens the freedoms the Fourth Amendment was adopted to protect. These concerns aren't just abstractions—every day, innocent people are harmed by officials' [abuse and misuse of these ALPRs](#).³

ALPRs have been used by federal, state, and local agencies to identify and track:

- Immigrants by [ICE](#)⁴
- Protestors by over [50 federal, state, and local agencies](#)⁵
- Op-ed writers by [local police](#)⁶
- Gun show attendees by the [DEA and ATF](#)⁷
- Abortion care seekers by [state and local police](#)⁸
- Ex-partners stalked by [police officers](#)⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATING ALPRs

ALPRs can be beneficial when used for law enforcement purposes, such as identifying a vehicle that has been reported as stolen or involved in a crime or locating a missing person. Those activities, when used appropriately and with clear safeguards, can be a reasonable use of the technology.

However, without strict use limitations and short retention periods, this data can quickly become a tool for broad, ongoing surveillance across our communities. In our society it is a core principle that the government does not invade people's privacy and collect information about citizens' innocent activities.

³ Ingraham, C. (2026, August 12). *The IJ Database of ALPR Abuse*. Institute for Justice. <https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/>

⁴ Koebler, J. (2025, May 27). *ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows*. 404 Media. <https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/>

⁵ Dave Maass and Rindala Alajaji. (2025, November 20). *How Cops Are Using Flock Safety's ALPR Network to Surveil Protesters and Activists*. Electronic Frontier Foundation. <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/how-cops-are-using-flock-safety-s-alpr-network-surveil-protesters-and-activists>

⁶ Stanley, J. (2026, February 3). *Kansas Town Uses License Plate Readers to Go After Man Who Wrote Op-Ed*. ACLU. <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/alpr-against-op-ed-writer>

⁷ Stanley, J., & Stein, B. (2015, January 27). *DEA Planned to Monitor Gun Show Attendees with License Plate Readers, New Emails Reveal*. American Civil Liberties Union. <https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/dea-planned-monitor-gun-show-attendees-license-plate-readers-new-emails-reveal>. Also see: DeFlockILM (2026, June 30). *They're Tracking Gun Owners and Hunters, too*. <https://deflockilm.org/flock-cameras-gun-owners-hunter/>

⁸ Rindala Alajaji. (2025, May 30). *She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down*. Electronic Frontier Foundation. <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down>

⁹ Harwell, D., MacMillan, D., & Schaffer, A. (2026, August 2). *How rogue officers turned a nationwide camera network into a tool for stalking*. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/02/how-police-officers-used-vast-network-cameras-spy-their-exes/>

An increasing non-partisan aversion to government surveillance and growing understanding of the heightened risks that ALPRs present is creating a positive climate for state laws and local actions that push back against this growing threat.

OPTION 1: STATEWIDE ALPR BAN

Although an ALPR ban may seem bold, given the increased public outcry and aversion to mass government surveillance coupled with rampant documented abuses of ALPR data, some states have decided that the paltry benefits of ALPRs do not justify the threats to their residents' privacy rights, including:

- **Florida:** In August 2026, [Governor Ron DeSantis banned](#) the use of ALPRs on all state highways, ordering the removal of all ALPRs from the right-of-way on state highways within 30 days, revoking all previously approved permits, and barring the issuance of future permits. The Florida Department of Transportation order cited a “recent exponential increase” in deployments of law enforcement cameras, as well as “concerning reports of misuse, data privacy concerns, and surveillance schemes” that merit immediate action “to preserve Floridians’ sovereignty and quality of life.”¹⁰
- **Texas:** In August 2026, [Governor Greg Abbott banned](#) state agencies from spending public funds on Flock cameras, halting all ALPR funding and pausing installation of ALPRs statewide.¹¹
- **Vermont:** Effective July 1, 2027, Vermont’s authorization of ALPRs will sunset, triggering a ban of all government use of ALPRs. Under [23 V.S.A. § 1609 of the Vermont Statutes](#), all state agencies, departments, and political subdivisions will be prohibited from using both ALPRs and automated traffic law enforcement (ATLE) systems once the deadline hits.¹²

In addition to these bans, over [150 municipalities](#) across the U.S. have decided to cancel, reject, or deactivate their Flock/ALPR contracts,¹³ including an average of **3.5 Flock terminations per day** in August 2026.

¹⁰ Florida Department of Transportation. (2026, August 31). *Revocation of General Use Permits for Automated License Plate Readers* (Memo No. 26-01). <https://fdotwww.blob.core.windows.net/sitefinity/docs/default-source/design/bulletins/eom26-01.pdf>

¹¹ Runnels, A., & Everlit. (2026, August 29). *Gov. Abbott blocks state agencies from spending money on Flock cameras*. Texas Tribune. <https://www.texastribune.org/2026/08/28/texas-greg-abbott-flock-cameras-order-state-money/>

¹² 23 V.S.A. § 1609. <https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/23/015/01609>

¹³ DeFlock. *City Council*. <https://deflock.org/council#wins>

OPTION 2: ESTABLISH STATEWIDE ALPR GUARDRAILS

Currently, [19 states](#) have ALPR-specific statutes on the books.¹⁴ State law should establish clear and consistent ALPR rules and guardrails. When localities are tasked with establishing their own ALPR rules, civil rights and civil liberties protections will be uneven and can be inadequate.

To avoid a patchwork of ALPR regulation, state law should—at a minimum—establish a baseline for data retention, data access, and database use for the commonwealth.

Localities should be free to impose additional limitations or restrictions, including bans, on ALPRs in their communities.

Below are [three critical guardrails](#) that any privacy-protective legislation should include when regulating ALPRs.¹⁵

1 | Data Retention Limitations

Problem: The more ALPR data that is captured and the longer it is retained, the more private information it reveals.

ALPR data can be run against hotlists in a matter of seconds, which makes a 30-day retention period unnecessary. Even if such data is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, a warrant for the data, which would allow it to be retained for longer, can be obtained within a few days.

Furthermore, state law cannot protect against federal agency demands for state/local ALPR data made through a judicial warrant or administrative subpoena.

- **Solution:** Significantly limit ALPR data retention unless linked to a specific investigation. 48 hours is more than enough time to retain license plate data that is not connected to a crime. Better yet, adopt [New Hampshire's 3-minute retention](#) policy. If you don't have the data, you cannot be forced by the federal government to turn it over.

¹⁴ Finding Flock. *License plate reader laws, state by state*. (Last updated August 8, 2026).

<https://www.findingflock.com/learn/alpr-laws-by-state>

¹⁵ Marlow, C., & Stanley, J. (2026, June 29). *How to Fight Deployment of Flock and Other Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers in Your Community*. American Civil Liberties Union. <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/how-to-fight-deployment-of-flock-and-other-mass-surveillance-license-plate-readers-in-your-community>

2 | Data Access/Sharing Restrictions

Problem: Without data sharing limits, ALPR data can be made available to unknown and untrusted recipients.

The greatest impact of Flock's growing dominance of the ALPR market is that ALPR data, which used to be largely limited to local use, is now frequently—by default—shared with law enforcement and other Flock customers nationwide (who, in turn, may share access to it with non-Flock customers by running searches on their behalf). In other words, Flock's nationwide data sharing model has made local ALPR data available to virtually any law enforcement entity who wishes to access it.

Furthermore, Flock's default provisions give the company a “worldwide” license to use its customers' ALPR data. That means law enforcement from virtually any other locality, state, federal agency, and even authoritarian foreign government¹⁶ can access Flock ALPR data.

- **Solution:** Prohibit data sharing outside of collecting department unless requestor has a judicial warrant.
- **Next best option:** Limit ALPR data sharing to only PA state and local entities, unless the requesting entity has a warrant for a crime recognized in PA.

3 | Database Use Restrictions

Problem: ALPRs can be used to target disfavored and vulnerable groups, for minor crime enforcement, and to generate suspicion out of thin air. Additionally, not all criminal databases against which ALPR data is run are reliable. In fact, the FBI's criminal database, the largest and most used national watch list, does not even comply with the [1974 United States Privacy Act's](#) basic accuracy, reliability, and completeness requirements. That means allowing your ALPR data to be run against such databases will subject anyone living in or visiting your town to the risk of unjustified arrest and detention. This is an especially dangerous proposition for members of vulnerable, overpoliced communities.

- **Solution:** Limit use to only the worst crimes (e.g., kidnapping) and prohibit inappropriate uses (e.g., identifying protestors).
- **Solution:** Limit the “hotlists” ALPR data can be run against to reliable, well-maintained state and local databases from Pennsylvania.

Thank you for the invitation to testify today and I welcome the opportunity to work with members to advance a privacy-protective ALPR bill in Pennsylvania.

¹⁶ While there is no evidence an authoritarian foreign government has accessed Flock ALPR data, there are no reliable measures in place to prevent one from doing so.

ACLU RESOURCES

- [ACLU Get the Flock Out Campaign](#)
- [ACLU Get the Flock Out Toolkit](#)
- **ACLU model legislation:**
 - [State government: Automatic License Plate Reader Privacy Model Bill](#)
 - [Local government: Automatic License Plate Reader Privacy Model Bill](#)
 - [Local government: Model Resolution for Local Flock Contract Cancellation](#)
- ["How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers"](#) [February 2023]
- ["Despite 'New' Updates, Flock's Creepy Cameras Remain Major Civil Liberties Threat"](#) [August 2026]
- ["Beware of Other License Plate Surveillance Companies Besides Flock"](#) [August 2026]
- [White Paper—Fast-Growing Company Flock is Building a New AI-Driven Mass-Surveillance System](#) [March 2022]



PENNSYLVANIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF BOROUGH

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Automated License Plate Readers

House Transportation & Judiciary Committees

September 28, 2026

Ron Grutza
Senior Director of Government Affairs

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Good morning, Chairman Neilson, Chairman Benninghoff, Chairman Briggs, Chairman Kauffman and members of the House Transportation & Judiciary Committees. My name is Ron Grutza, Senior Director of Government Affairs for the Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs (PSAB). Today I am pleased to testify on behalf of the thousands of borough officials throughout the Commonwealth on the issue of automated license plate readers (ALPR).

The Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs is a statewide, non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to serving the 955 borough governments in Pennsylvania. Since 1911, PSAB has represented the interests of boroughs and helped to shape the laws that laid their foundation. Today, the Association continues to improve and assist local governments through legislative advocacy, research, education, and other services.

With more than 2.4 million Pennsylvanians residing in borough communities, borough officials strive to deliver quality leadership and service to citizens across the Commonwealth. Today, boroughs represent 37.5 percent of all municipal governments in the Commonwealth. An average of 15 boroughs exist per county and nearly 20 percent of the state's population resides in our boroughs.

I am thankful for the opportunity to provide testimony today to discuss the issues surrounding the use of automated license plate readers by local governments. I will detail how and why our members are choosing this technology, why this technology is important to our communities, and what should be considered for potential legislation on the use of ALPRs.

Boroughs operate with small police departments, limited investigative resources, and rising vehicle-related crime. Motor vehicle theft has surged nationally in recent years after the pandemic, and clearance rates have fallen to historic lows. In 2023, agencies participating in the FBI's NIBRS system cleared only 8.2 percent of reported motor vehicle thefts, the lowest clearance rate for any major offense category. For boroughs with only a handful of officers on duty at any given time, this gap is even more acute. ALPRs are one of the few technologies that allow small departments to multiply their investigative reach without multiplying personnel costs.

Recent research shows that ALPRs are effective and measurably improve public safety outcomes. A 2026 multi-agency study covering 216 law enforcement agencies found that motor vehicle theft fell by 11 percent after ALPR deployment, while clearance rates rose by nearly 16 percent.¹ Another national analysis confirmed similar results, showing an 11 percent decline in vehicle theft and a 16 percent increase in clearances in the year following installation.² For boroughs, where a single stolen vehicle can consume days of investigative time, these improvements are transformative. ALPRs also help solve serious crimes beyond vehicle theft by locating missing persons, identifying vehicles connected to violent offenses, and providing real-time alerts for wanted individuals. For small departments that rely heavily on mutual aid, ALPRs act as a force multiplier, giving borough officers access to investigative leads they would otherwise never have.

¹ Lum, Cynthia; Koper, Christopher; et al. *Evaluating Automated License Plate Readers: Impacts on Motor Vehicle Theft and Clearance Rates*. Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason University, 2026

² International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). *ALPR Effectiveness in Vehicle Theft Reduction: National Analysis*. IACP Research Division, 2025.

The need for ALPRs has become even more pressing since the passage of Act 89 in 2013, which eliminated Pennsylvania's physical license plate registration sticker. While the change reduced administrative costs, it also removed the single most visible, low-tech compliance indicator available to local police and code officers. Borough police officers and code officers can no longer quickly determine whether a vehicle's registration is expired, suspended, or fraudulent during routine patrol. Without a sticker, officers must manually run each plate to verify compliance, a process that is time-consuming, resource-intensive, and often impossible during traffic congestion, emergency response, or nighttime patrol. For small borough departments, registration enforcement has effectively become reactive rather than proactive.

ALPRs restore that lost capability. They allow borough police to automatically identify expired, suspended, or stolen registrations in real time, detect vehicles with fraudulent or cloned plates, and improve roadway safety by ensuring that unregistered vehicles are not circulating in the community. They also support statewide revenue integrity, since registration compliance directly affects PennDOT funding streams in the Motor License Fund. In practical terms, ALPRs provide the modern equivalent of the registration sticker — but far more accurately, and without requiring officers to divert attention from patrol or public-safety duties. For boroughs that lack the staffing to conduct regular registration enforcement details, ALPRs are the only realistic tool that restores the compliance visibility lost after Act 89.

Additionally, local code enforcement officers have utilized the technology to ensure vehicles are properly registered. Many boroughs have junk vehicle ordinances which prohibit the storage of unregistered vehicles on streets. Without the visual license plate registration sticker, code enforcement officials who have access to ALPR data can quickly determine if the vehicle is in violation of the local ordinance. Any legislation regulating ALPRs should allow this important tool to continue to be available for local governments.

Real-world experience in Pennsylvania already shows how boroughs benefit from ALPRs. In 2020, Whitehall Borough Police played a critical role in stopping a potentially catastrophic domestic terrorism incident when their "be on the lookout" bulletin for a suspect's vehicle was picked up by an ALPR system in a neighboring municipality. That alert enabled officers to quickly locate the car, conduct a safe stop, and arrest an individual who was later found with improvised explosive devices and weapons. This case demonstrates how even a single borough's participation in an ALPR network can produce life-saving results. Other borough police departments, such as Chambersburg Borough, report using ALPRs to support ongoing investigations, recover stolen vehicles, and identify wanted individuals more quickly than traditional methods allow. These examples show that ALPRs are not theoretical tools; they are already helping borough police solve crimes, protect residents, and contribute meaningfully to regional public-safety efforts.

It is important to acknowledge that ALPRs have generated public debate, particularly around data retention, misuse and transparency. These concerns are real, but they are also solvable. Clear guardrails, including strict limits on retention of images, audit logs for every search, prohibitions on certain queries, and public reporting on usage, ensure that ALPRs enhance safety without compromising civil liberties. Many of these safeguards are already standard practice across the

country. The question before us is not whether boroughs and local governments should use ALPRs, but whether they will adopt them with the right oversight.

For boroughs with tight budgets, ALPRs are among the most cost-effective modern policing tools. They provide continuous coverage without overtime, reduce manual workload through automated alerts, and strengthen regional cooperation by enabling data-sharing among neighboring municipalities. This is precisely the kind of technology that allows small communities to keep pace with modern public-safety challenges.

Considering the benefits ALPRs provide communities and the investments already made for equipment and software, PSAB opposes any legislation to prohibit the use of ALPRs by municipal police, parking enforcement or code enforcement. We are open to reasonable regulations that allow municipal police to continue using the technology responsibly.

In closing, ALPRs are proven, effective, and essential tools for today's borough police departments. They reduce crime, improve clearance rates, restore registration-compliance visibility lost after Act 89, and help officers protect residents more efficiently. With appropriate safeguards, ALPRs strike the right balance between public safety and privacy. I urge the General Assembly to support legislation and funding that allows Pennsylvania boroughs to deploy ALPRs responsibly and effectively.

Thank you for your consideration of our testimony. I am happy to answer any questions at this time.

September 28, 2026

The Honorable Tim Briggs
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee
302 Main Capitol Building
P.O. Box 202149
Harrisburg, PA 17120-2149

The Honorable Ed Neilson
Chairman, House Transportation Committee
127 Irvis Office Building
P.O. Box 202174
Harrisburg, PA 17120-2174

Dear Chairman Briggs, Chairman Neilson and Members of the House Judiciary and Transportation Committees:

Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony on how Motorola Solutions responsibly deploys Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology in Pennsylvania. At Motorola Solutions, our primary mission is to engineer safety and security tools that protect law enforcement officers and the communities they serve. We appreciate this opportunity to outline how our technologies support community safety while maintaining rigorous safeguards for individual privacy.

Our law enforcement partners routinely leverage our tools to achieve vital, life-saving outcomes—including rescuing abducted children, locating endangered seniors, identifying and stopping violent offenders, and dismantling organized auto-theft syndicates.

ALPR is a tool engineered specifically to help law enforcement solve crimes, locate missing individuals, and disrupt dangerous illegal activity. Within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, our technology is already delivering tangible safety benefits such as:

- Assisting law enforcement in identifying stolen vehicles and wanted suspects along major transit corridors, including I-376 and Route 28.
- Aiding a local police department in Franklin County in locating wanted individuals, finding missing/endangered persons, recovering stolen vehicles, and building evidence in major investigations such as homicides, drive-by shootings, and violent felony offenses.
- Dismantling an interstate vehicle theft ring operating across Pennsylvania and New Jersey, resulting in the arrest and felony conviction of multiple key subjects on theft and conspiracy charges.

Motorola Solutions engineers its ALPR technology exclusively to identify vehicles in public spaces using optical character recognition and non-personal, vehicle-related attributes, such as

vehicle make, model, and color. The technology's hardware and algorithms are purpose-built for license plate capture and do not support facial recognition or human biometric tracking.

To help ensure these tools are operated responsibly, Motorola Solutions integrates the following rigorous data privacy controls, strict security standards, and regulatory compliance mechanisms directly into our platform architecture:

- **Default Zero Data Sharing:** Agency customers own and control their data. Company policy and contractual terms strictly prohibit Motorola Solutions employees from accessing customer data, with the sole exception of explicit, customer-supervised access granted for technical support.
- **Centralized Sharing Dashboards:** Our sharing dashboard enables administrators to maintain complete visibility over active data-sharing connections, allowing for quick modifications or bulk revocations at any time.
- **Automated Audit Logging:** Every system query is logged automatically. Administrators can generate and configure comprehensive reports detailing user identities, timestamps, and search justifications.
- **Responsible Data Retention:** Motorola Solutions' law enforcement customers set their own data retention schedules to comply with local and state laws, department standards, and Criminal Justice Information Services ("CJIS") requirements. We configure all new ALPR law enforcement products with a default data retention period of seven days.
- **Robust Security Systems:** Law enforcement customer accounts are managed independently by agency administrators under CJIS standards. Our platform requires, at a minimum, that users provide a case number, authorized purpose, and authorized reason to initiate a search.

We look forward to engaging with lawmakers as they work to develop legislation in this area to support responsible technology that protects both public safety with civil liberties. Motorola Solutions aligns with a national coalition of law enforcement officials including but not limited to the International Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP"), Major County Sheriffs of America ("MCSA") and the National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA") —in recommending an ALPR policy framework structured around three foundational pillars:

1. Data Ownership

- **Ownership:** Law enforcement agencies must retain 100% ownership and control over their ALPR data. Vendors must never pool, access, or share agency records.
- **Zero-Trust Default:** Data should only be shared with other law enforcement agencies essential to performing the public safety purpose. For Motorola Solutions, the default for data sharing in our ALPR system is “off.”
- **Hardware & Storage Integrity:** Deployments must use CJIS-compliant environments with hardware-level encryption to maintain the chain of custody. Motorola Solutions aligns with industry standards including ISO and NIST, and requires multi-factor authentication for access by all users.

2. Operational Safeguards

- **Investigative Leads Only:** An ALPR hit is a starting point, not proof of guilt. Officers must independently verify the license plate, state, and warrant status before taking enforcement action.
- **Civil Liberties Protections:** ALPR systems should be tied to documented public safety purposes. Usage targeting individuals engaged in lawful political, religious, or constitutionally protected activity must be strictly prohibited.
- **Retention Limits:** Data should be retained only as long as legally permitted and necessary for legitimate law enforcement investigative needs under local policy, then automatically purged.

3. Accountability

- **Audit Controls:** Systems should automatically log user activity including law enforcement searches and justifications. For example, every action in Motorola Solution’s system is auditable and subject to routine supervisory audits.
- **Training and Limited Access:** Only trained and authorized individuals should have access to ALPR systems and data, and the number of individuals permitted to access these systems and data should be limited to only those who are necessary.
- **Transparency:** ALPR practices should be shared publicly with communities to build trust in the use of the technology.

Conclusion

Motorola Solutions remains deeply committed to ethical innovation, transparency, and accountability. Our Responsible Technology Blueprint serves as an operational framework to ensure our innovation aligns with strict ethical standards. This is further supported by our internal Technology Advisory Committee and our industry-leading AI Labels, which clearly disclose product technology types, intended uses, data ownership rules, and human oversight controls.

Motorola Solutions commends Pennsylvania lawmakers for addressing the proper framework for ALPR deployment within the Commonwealth. We welcome the opportunity to share operational

best practices and stand ready to partner with the Legislature to establish clear standards that enhance public safety while steadfastly protecting the civil liberties of all Pennsylvanians.

Thank you,



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